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Case Comments
Agency: Effect of Written Agency Authorization
Statutes on Agent's Indemnification From Principal
Plaintiff corporation orally agreed with the defendant to act
in its own name in selling apricot kernels as the defendant's agent.'
When the market price of apricot kernels rose sharply,2 the de-
fendant refused to deliver the kernels necessary to perform a writ-
ten contract that plaintiff had made with a third party pursuant
to the agency agreement. Plaintiff satisfied the judgment which
the third party subsequently obtained against it3 and then sought
recovery from the defendant based on an implied promise of in-
demnity in the agency agreement for liability incurred in its per-
formance.4 The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
for the plaintiff, one justice dissenting, and held that section 2809
of the California Civil Code, which requires an agent's authority
to enter into contracts within the Statute of Frauds to be in
writing, is not a defense to an agent's action for indemnification
1. Plaintiff was to deal in its own name because it was well known in the
field.
2. The price agreed upon for the sale of the kernels was 171/20 a pound.
Later a fire destroyed a large part of the California apricot kernel stock and
defendant sold 431 tons of pits for 460 a pound and 110 tons for 650 a pound.
(The pits had to be cracked at the buyer's expense to obtain the kernels.)
3. Plaintiff appealed in this action but lost. Sunset-Sternau Food Co. v.
American Almond Prod. Co., 259 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1958).
4. See Rimington v. General Ace. Group of Ins. Cos., 205 Cal. App. 2d 394,
897, 23 Cal. Rptr. 40, 42 (1962); Walkof v. Fox, 90 Misc. 338, 340, 158 N.Y.
Supp. 27, 28 (Sup. Ct. 1915); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY§ 438 (1957).
The Restatement provides:
In the absence of terms to the contrary in the agreement of employ-
ment, the principal has a duty to indemnify the agent where the agent
(a) makes a payment ... made necessary in executing the principal's
affairs or ... (b) suffers a loss which, because of their relation, it is fair
that the principal should bear.
5. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2809 provides that "an oral authorization is sufficient
for any purpose, except that an authority to enter into a contract required by
law to be in writing can only be given by an instrument in writing." Cal. Stat.
1931, ch. 1070, § 13, at 2261 (replaced by CA,. CoMM. CODE § 2201), provided
that "a contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value
of five hundred dollars or upward shall not be enforceable by action unless
. some note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed
by the party to be charged. . . ." Since the total sales price in the contract
between plaintiff and the third party was $26,750, plaintiff needed written
authorization to enter into the sales contract with the third party, on defend-
ant's behalf.
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even though the third party could not have enforced the contract
against the principal. Sunset-Sternau Food Co. v. Bonzi, 60 Cal.
2d 834, 389 P.2d 133, 36 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1964).
The problem treated in Bonzi is not peculiar to California.
At least one other State has a similar statute dealing with an
agent's authorization for a sale of goods contract and several
States impose the written authorization requirement for real
property transactions.0 In the absence of a statute requiring an
agent's authorization to be in writing, any recognized form of
authorization enables an agent to bind his principal and a third
party.7 Furthermore, the authorization operates as an implied
promise by the principal to compensate the agent for any loss
which he incurs in the course of the agency. Bonzi considers the
effect that a written agency requirement has on a principal's duty
to indemnify his improperly authorized agent.
Absent ratification? and estoppel,' section 9309 does not per-
mit a third party to recover from a principal on a contract which
is required by law to be in writing when the agent executing the
contract was not given written authority." Section 2309, however,
has been held not to be a defense to a defectively authorized
agent's action against his principal for an earned commission
on the grounds that the subject of suit is an agency agreement
rather than the sales contract at which the section is directed.
The court in Bonzi concluded from the commission cases that
section 2309 can not be used as a defense by a principal in an
indemnity action brought by an agent. The Bonzi situation, how-
ever, seems more like the third party suit - the agent recovers
6. Montana has the same requirement as § 2309. MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 2-116 (1947). Other state statutes provide that contracts for interests
in land are void unless signed by the party sought to be charged or his agent
authorized in writing. IDAnO CODE ANN. § 9-505 (5) (1948); MrcH. Cour. LAWS
§ 566.108 (1948); Mum. STAT. § 513.05 (1961); N.J. REV. STAT. § 25:1-1 (1937);
UTAn CODE ANN. § 25-5-1 (1953). These statutes present the same problem of
interpretation as § 2809 if the agent binds himself to a third party with-
out written authorization from the principal and the principal subsequently
refuses to perform.
7. E.g., Bibb v. Allen, 149 U.S. 481 (1899); Rodman v. Weinberger, 81
N.J.L. 441, 79 Atl. 338 (Ct. Err. & App. 1911).
8. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
9. McBride v. McCartney, 53 Cal. App. 707, 200 Pac. 756 (1921); CAr,.
CIv. CODE § 2307.
10. See Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 Pac. 88 (1909).
11. E.g., McNear v. Petroleum Export Corp., 208 Cal. 162, 280 Pac. 684
(1929); Seymour v. Oelrichs, supra note 10; cf. Georgia Peanut Co. v. Famo
Prods. Co., 96 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1938).
12. E.g., Marks v. Walter G. McCarty Corp., 3 Cal. 2d 814, 205 P.2d
1025 (1949); Meadows v. Clark, 33 Cal. App. 2d 24, 90 P.2d 851 (1939).
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from the principal the amount the third party could not have
directly recovered from the principal because the agency agree-
ment was not in writing. Thus, the result forbidden by section
2309 is reached by indirection.
The Bonzi court, in construing section 2309, considered only
two factors as evidence of the intent of the legislature. The Code
Commissioner's note to the chapter containing section 2309 im-
plies that the chapter does not apply to the agent-principal
relationship.'- In addition, the California Civil Code requires a
real estate broker to have written authorization to recover his
commission;' 4 since the sale of real property is within the Cali-
fornia Statute of Frauds,', this would be surplusage if section
2309 were applied to an agent's rights against his principal. Al-
though these points are relevant in construing section 2309,o
they are not a substitute for considering the purpose of the stat-
ute." Section 2309 appears to have the purpose of protecting a
principal from a third party who attempts to avoid the Statute
of Frauds by falsely claiming that the contract sought to be
enforced was executed by the principal's agent. The section seeks
13. The Code Commissioner's note reads as follows:
Note-Under this head the representations of one person by another
is the only subject treated. The rights acquired by third persons against
'both principal and agent are here stated. The mutual relations of princi-
pal and agent are a branch of SERVICE and are defined in the title
on that subject.
Comment, 5 So. CAL. L. REv. 23, 236 n.22 (1932). This is an oversight on
the part of the Code Commissioner. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2295-2300 ("Definition
of Agency") relates to the principal-agent relationship.
14. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1624.5 provides that "an agreement authorizing or
employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation
or a commission" is invalid unless it is in writing and subscribed by the party
to be charged.
15. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1624.4 provides that "an agreement for the ...
sale of real property . . ." is invalid unless it is in writing and subscribed by
the party sought to be charged.
16. See Baranov v. Scudder, 177 Cal. 458, 465, 170 Pac. 1122, 1124 (1918);
People v. Parvin, 74 Cal. 549, 555, 16 Pac. 490, 493 (1888).
17. In construing a statute the court should look to the problem the legis-
lature wished to solve. Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620, 629 (1926)
(dictum); United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255, 261 (1890) (dictum);
2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4501 (3d ed. 1943). It is the pur-
pose of a statute which should be considered when its true meaning is sought.
See Hines v. Stein, 298 U.S. 94 (1935). When the language of a statute is
plain, it should be accepted by the court as evidence of the intent of the legis-
lature. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); United States v.
First Nat'l Bank, 234 U.S. 245 (1914); United States v. Lexington Mill &
Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399 (1914); State v. Duggan, 15 R.I. 403, 6 AtI. 787
(1886).
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to achieve this purpose by prohibiting the enforcement of any
contract within the Statute of Frauds if the executing agent did
not have written authority. The result reached in the Bonzi case
has the effect of allowing a principal to use section 2309 effec-
tively as a defense only if he had the foresight to engage an
insolvent agent!" Certainly such a construction does not conform
with the legislative design.
The Bonzi decision is largely based on the concept that the
Statute of Frauds should receive a limiting interpretation when
the equities clearly call for it, as they do in the Bonzi case, and
there is some doubt as to whether the fact situation is within
the statute.' The Statute of Frauds was directed at the preven-
tion of fraud and a court should be reluctant to allow it to be
put to the use of a wrongdoer; it was intended to serve as a pro-
tector of the innocent, not as a means of fraud to be used by the
unscrupulouso
This desire to construe the Statute of Frauds narrowly to
avoid an unjust result in a case, such as Bonzi, where the contract
is not denied, stems largely from a feeling that to allow a party
to rely on the formal defense of the Statute of Frauds while ad-
mitting the questioned agreement would be purposeless.2 ' Perhaps
18. CA. Civ. CODE § 2778.1 provides that "upon an indemnity against
liability . . . the person indemnified is entitled to recover upon becoming
liable." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778.2 provides that "upon an indemnity against
... damages ... the person indemnified is not entitled to recover without
payment thereof." The Bondi case fits under subdivision two since the principal
is only required to indemnify the agent for damages sustained. The reason for
this policy is a fear that if the principal pays the agent before the damages
are sustained the agent may be unjustly enriched or injured since the amount
of damage is not accurately ascertainable. See note 4 supra.
19. See generally 2 CoRBIN, CONTRACTs § 275, at 13 (1950). Contra, Llen-
thal, Judicial Repeal of the Statute of Frauds, 9 HAnv. L. REV. 455 (1896);
Llewellyn, What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J.
704, 747-48 (1931).
0. Whenever it is obvious by clear evidence that the Statute of Frauds
is being invoked by a wrongdoer who wants only to escape from being held to
his word, the court shall refuse to allow him to find protection behind a statute
that was intended to prevent fraud. Morris, The Leading Purpose Doctrine as
Applied to the Statute of Frauds, 62 W. VA. L. REv. 839 (1960).
21. Arguably, the Statute of Frauds should be modified so as to be un-
available as a defense if the agreement is admitted. The Uniform Commercial
Code provides that a contract which is within the Statute of Frauds but
which has not been reduced to writing is still enforceable "if the party against
whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise
in court -that a contract for sale was made . . . ." UnrORM CoMnWERCIAls CODE
§ 2-201(8). Corbin would require a party who wishes to use the statute to
deny under oath the existence of the questioned agreement. 2 CoRIN, Cow-
TRACTS § 275, at 18 (1950).
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section 2309 and other similar formalistic statutes should be
modified or abolished by the legislature. It is argued that the
Statute of Frauds has outlived is purpose;2 2 that it does not re-
flect actual practices in the business community" and often is
invoked only to enable a party to renege on an oral business
agreement which he reasonably expected to honor2 ' This possible
need for changing section 2309, however, does not justify the
court's ignoring the purpose of that section to overthrow it
through strained construction. Though the court felt that to
deny plaintiff recovery would be inequitable," it may have ex-
ceeded its proper function by deciding the case as it did. The
solution to a harsh law is legislative change, not unwarranted
judicial interpretation 6
22.
The Statute of Frauds is therefore essentially and necessarily, in
some of its features at least, a temporary phenomenon in the evolution
of contract law. Born of a desire to prevent the imposition of liability
by means of perjured testimony, the need for it must decrease as the
means of discovering and punishing perjury are increased. This danger
has undoubtedly been greatly lessened by alteration made during the
last fifty years in the law of evidence.
2 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 196 (1906).
28. 6 HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 896 (9d ed. 1937): "[Tlhe
prevailing feeling both in the legal and the commercial world is, and has for a
long time been, that these clauses have outlived their usefulness, and are
quite out of place amid the changed legal and commercial conditions of today."
But see, Clark & Whiteside, The Statute of Frauds and the Business Com-
munity: A Re-appraisal in Light of Prevailing Practices, 66 Y.ALE LJ. 1088,
1064 (1957). The Yale Law Journal conducted a study of 200 Connecticut
manufacturers of various sizes and concluded from the 87 responses that busi-
ness practices would not be substantially changed if the Statute of Frauds
were repealed since businessmen would still want written records of all large
transactions to avoid the uncertainties which commonly aecompany oral agree-
ments.
24. See, e.g., Stephen & Pollock, Section Seventeen of the Statute of Frauds,
1 L.Q. REv. 1, 5-7 (1885); Willis, The Statute of Frauds-a Legal Anachronism
(pts. 1-2), S InD. LJ. 427, 528, 540-42 (1928).
25. The court felt that the equities were clearly on the side of the plain-
tiff. "We find neither statutory provision nor legal principle to sanction the
profit which the principal thus derives from his wrong." 60 Cal. 9d at 843, 889
P.2d at 139, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 747. And again: "Surely he [defendant principal]
should be accountable for the liability incurred by the agent upon the agree-
ment, particularly in the instance of the principal's own refusal to perform
his obligation." 60 Cal. 2d at 842, 389 P.2d at 139, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
26. E.g., United States v. First Nat Bank, 234 U.S. 245 (1918); State v.
Duggan, 15 RI. 403, 6 Atl. 787 (1886); of. Baranov v. Scudder, 177 Cal. 458,
465, 170 Pac. 1122, 1124 (1918).
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